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During the 197(k, developing countries differed widely in their regimes of nonresident
interest withholding taxes. This paper provides evidence on the relationship between interest rates
paid by private LDC borrowers on international credits and the withholding tax regime. Pre-tax
interest rates are estimated to have increased significantly with withholding tax rates. The extent
of the mark-up of withholding taxes into higher pre-tax interest rates reflects the offsetting foreign
tax credits that banks expect to receive. These expected tax credits represent the incidence of the
nonresident withholding taxes on creditor country treasuries. Estimated expected tax credits, as
reflected in bank interest rates, vary with the year of loan origination and they are relatively large
for short term loans.
This research was conducted while the author was a consultant in the Debt and Internatio-
nal Finance Division of the World Bank. Any opinions expressed are not necessarily those
of the World Bank. I thank Patricia Brown, Allen Frankel, Harry Gruhert, setninar
participants at IGIER, the IMF, the NBER. UC Santa Cruz and StanforJ Law School and
two anonymous referees for helpful comments.I
I. Introduclron
In an open economy, taxes on the return to capital are potentially in part exported in the
sense that they are borne by nonresidents. A country's ability to export its capital income taxes is
related importantly to its market power in the internatiortal capital market. Correspondingly,
Goulder (1990) argues that the welfare gains for the United States following a reintroduction of a
30 per cent nonresident withholding tax on portfolio interest depend on the substitutability between
U.S. and non-U.S. assets. In this regard, foreign tax credits that international investors may
receive to offset foreign capital incotne taxes are also important. To illustrate, Damus, Hobson
and Thirsk (1991) focus on how the U.S. foreign tax credit regime affects Canada's ability to
export part of its corporate income tax. They show that the welfaze gains for Canada following an
increase in the corporate income tax are far greater, if U.S. investors can receive offsetting
foreign tax credits from the U.S. Treasury.
While foreign tax credits clearly affect the international incidence of capital incóme taxes,
little systematic evidence exists about their significance to international investors in practice. We
can obtain such evidence, however, by observing how pre-tax returns on international financial
assets are affected by the tax regime in the capital-importing countries. In this vein, this paper
examines how pre-tax interest rates on private international loans are affected by interest
withholding taxes imposed by the borrowing countries. The paper specifically examines internatio-
nal bank loans to private borrowers in developing countries originated during the pre-international
debt crisis period of 1971 to 198L'
Source country withholding tax rates typically vary with the residence and status of the
interest payor. Countries, for instance, tend to exempt interest on the public debt from nonresident
withholding taxation and they may exempt bank interest.2 If withholding taxes are not avoided or
evaded, then the foreign tax credit regime in the lender's state of resídence c:an be expected to be
a main determinant of pre-tax interest rates. Absent income effects and international capital market
power on the part of the borrowing country, pre-tax interest rates rise by the full withholding tax
liability, if there are no foreign tax credits available at all. In this itutance, the withholding tax is
borne entirely by the private borrower. At the other extreme, pre-tax interest rates do not reflect
withholding tax rates, if fully offsetting foreign tax credits are available. In this case, the withhol-z
ding tax is wholly horne by the treasury of the creditor's state of residence.
The eviderx:e in this paper sugg~ts that the mark-up oF withhulJing taxcs into higher pre-
tax interest rates in the LDC loan market has only been partial. The incidence of interest
withholding taxes thus has been shared by the LDC private borrowers and the creditor country
treasuries. As the incidence is partly shifted towards the creditor country treasury, the debtor
country overall benefits from withholding taxes by way of lower net-of-tax international interest
rates. Withholding taxes, however, are estitnated to increase pre-tax interest rates, which suggests
that they hamper interna[ional capital flows. The estimated rate of mark-up is smallest during the
high lending year of 1977. At the same time, the estimated mark-up is smaller for loans with a
maturity of 3 or fewer years than for longer term loans.
The evidence presented in this paper ttecessarily relates to a particular international credit
market and a particular period in time. The mark-up in the LDC bank loan market may be only
partial, because cotnmercial banks are generally subject to national corporate income taxation.
Banks in principle, therefore, can obtain foreign tax credits. In financial markets dominated by
tax-exempt institutions, the rnark-up may well be larger. Commercial banks generally also are
required by their national authorities to prepare consolidated income statements, which makes the
underreporting of foreign source interest income by banks more difficult. Withholding taxes on
bank interest, therefore, may not be significant in reducing the taz evasion of foreign source
interest income. In this regard, withholding taxes may be more important in preventing the tax
evasion by private individuals. The evidettce in this paper is also special, as it relates to the period
preceding the 1986 U.S. tax reform that significantly restricted the creditability of foreign interest
withholding taxes.
Several studies have previously examined Ihe detemiination of interest rates in the
internati~nal loan market. Feder and Ross [ 1982], for instance, relate interest rates on Eurodollar
loans to subjective country risk assessments. Feder and lust [1977], Edwards [1984], and ~zler
[ 1993] further examine how LDC loan spreads reflect various tnacroeconomic country risk
indicators and earlier payments difficulties, if any. These studies have ignored the relationship
between earlier withholding tax regime and lending rates. For the case of Germany, Nóhrbass and
Raab [1990], however, show that the yield on Deutschtnark bonds fully reflects the 10 per cent3
withholding tax in force in early 1989.' Frankel [1984, 1985] offers an early analysis of the role
of the nonresident withholding taxes in banks' overall asset allocation choice and in the pricing of
loans.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the bank's
international loan pricing problem. Competitive bank interest rates reflect the tax treatment of
interest by the lending and borrowing countries and the borrowers' overall creditworthiness. Of
particular significance are the foreign tax credits a bank expects to receive. The share of the
withholding tax borne by the creditor country treasury is a parameter in the loan pricing
relationship, and in the resulting estimating equation. Section 3 discusses the data used in this
study, and it presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The internationa! loan pricing problem
International loan contracts can specify a net-of-withholding tax interest rate to be received
by the creditor, or they can specify a pre-tax, gross interest rate to be paid by the borrower.
Banks generally prefer to write contracts that specify net interest rates, as they wish their net-of-
withholding interest receipts to be independent of changes in the withholding tax regime. At
present, the creditability of foreign interest withholding taxes in the United States does not depend
on the type of loan contract. U.S. banks, therefore, overwhelmingly write international loan
contracts that specify a net interest rates. Until the mid 1970s, however, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in the U.S. disallowed U.S. banks foreign tax credits for withholding taxes paid on
net loans, as the withholding taxes were argued to be paid by the borrower and not by the U.S.
hank.' At that tinu, II.S. banks, thcrefore, had a tax incen[ive ta write loans specifying gross
interest rates. This section examines a bank's international loan pricing problem. In setting interest
rates, a bank takes into account taxation as well as credit risk associatecJ with the borrower
country and individualloan characteristics.
Let i be the net interest rate, and let rw be the withholding tax rate levied by the
borrowing country. The gross interest rate, is, simply equals il(1-rW), while the tax withheld per
dollar of principal is ir„!(I-r„). Let i~ be the bank's cost of funds, and let r~ be the marginal4
corporate income tax rate applied to the bank's foreign source interest income. The tax rates r.
and rw are non-negative and less than unity. The bank can deduct its cost of funds from its foreign
sourcc taxahlc incumc. In principlc, furcign intcresl wilhhulding laxcs arc crcdilablc againsl Ihc
bank's home country income taxes.' If actual foreign source taxes exceed the foreign credit
limitation, however, the bank is in an excess credit position. In the U.S., the foreign tax credit
limitation is the (pre-credit) U.S. tax liability on the foreign source income.
Nonresident interest withholding taxes typically are in Ihe range from 0 to 30 per cent,
while corporate tax rates in the major creditor countries exceed 30 per cent. This suggests that
b:mks will never be in au excess credit pusitiuu. "1'hix rcasuning is nol currrcl, huwever, as
creditor and borrower country definitions of the income tax base tend to differ. The debtor
country, in particular, imposes withholding taxes on gross interest income, while the creditor
country taxes the bank's interest income net of interest and other expenses.b
In practice, a bank cannot perfectly foresee at the time of loan origination whether the
potential tax credits associated with a particular loan will be realized ex post. This uncertainty
reflects that a bank's other, generally uncertain, foreign source income and expenses also may
affect the foreign tax credits that are allowed. Formally, let a be the probability that a bank will
be able to realize the potential foreign tax credits associated with a marginal loan. If so, Ihe
bank's marginal tax rate on foreign source interest income, r~, is positive. With probablity 1-~,
the bank instead is in an excess credit position. In that instance, the bank pays no income tax in
the creditor nation on its foreign source income, and the marginal, post-credit corporate income
tax rate is zero.
In setting interest rates, banks also take into account default risk. Let p be the probability
of loan default. For simplicity, we assume that the bank does not receive any inleres[ or principal
repayment in case of default. The bank's home country tax authority is assumed to provide a full
loss offset against the corporate income tax in case of loan default (unless the bank pays no
income tax on tiueign source income). Banks are assumed to be risk neutral, anJ bank competiti-
on ensures that a bank's expected after-tax profits from a marginal loan are zero.' This gives rise
to the following pricing relalionship for a single pericxl, unit-value loan,5
I t~i'(I -r~) t(I -~)i' -
a ~(I -p)( I a r 1-
I - Tw I - rw ' r~PJ
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The left hand side of (1) represents the expected net-of-tax principal and interest expense
of a unit-value loan. The expression reFlects that with probability a the bank will have taxable
foreign source income from which to deduct its cost of funds, ï. The two tenns on the right hand
side of (1) are the net-of-tax proceeds of the loan for the cases where the bank can and cannot
realize its marginal foreign tax credits. In the first instance, which occurs with probabiblity a, the
bank receives a principal repayment (equal to I), the net-of-withholding tax interest payment
(eyual to i), and the foreign tax crectit (equal to [r„~(I - r„)Ji), while it pays corporate income tax
on the gross interest receipt (equal to [r~l(l - rW)]i), all in case of loan repayment. In case of
default, the bank instead receives the after-tax value of the tax loss offset (equal to r~p). In the
excess credit case, which occurs with probability 1- a, the bank obtains no foreign tax credit and
the bank's marginal corporate, post-credit income tax rate is set to uro.
After dividing (I) by I- ar~ and rearranging, we obtain,




The parameter Q indicates how much the net interest payment, i, flowing from the country
is reduced, if the withholding tax payment, equal to [r„~(t - rW)]i, to the country is increased by
unity for given values of i~ and p. The parameter Q, which satifies p~ Q ~ l, thus is
natur:dly interprrt~Yl as the share of withholJing tax borne by the creditor country treasury, while
I- Q is the share of the withholding tax borne by the private borrower. The incidence parameter,6
p, increases with the probabibility, a, that the potential credit is realized. A higher value of o~ can
be interpreted as a more generous fiireign tax credit regime, aixl this naturally increa.ces the share
of the nonresident withholding tax borne by the creditor country treasury. The expression for Q
also reveals that it declines with the corporate income taz rate, r~, if 0 c rr c I. To see why,
note that a higher withholding tax rate leads to a higher pre-tax interest ra[e. This leads to an
increase in the bank's expected corporate tax bill, as it is the bank's pre-tax foreign source interest
income that is subject to corporate income taxation. The pre-tax and thus the net interest rates
have to rise sufficiently to offset the rise in the bank's corporate tax Iiability.
The probability of loan default, p, is assumed to reFlect country as well as on loan
characteristics.e Country variables that have previously been considered good indicators of credit
risk include the country's debt service to exports ratio, and the debt to GNP ratio. Loan specific
variahles that can influence the probability of default are loan size and maturity. Default
probabilities are also expected to be positively related to the gross interest rate, iR, as the gross
interest rate represents the withholding tax-inclusive interest expense to the private borrower.'
The probability of default, p, is assumed to have the following functional form,
iF, ~ y~x~
P - ~-~
I ' tK~ y~x~
(3)
where the x, are risk factors other than the gross interest rate, iR, acxl where thc ry, are paratllelers.
After inserting (3) into (2), we obtain the following expression,




The sign of the relationship between the net interest rate, i, and the wi[hholding tax rate,
~,,, implicit in (4) is in principle ambiguous. This is because a higher withholding tax rate
increases the risk of default and thus the risk premium reflected in the net interest rate, if it
increases the gross interest rate. A higher tax rate, on the other hand, enlarges potential tax credits
for a given net interest rate, which tends to reduce the required net rate of interest. Using (4), we
can find that,
di i
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(5)
Hence, we see that dildrw 1 0, if (i - i7li 1 R and vice versa. A higher withholding tax
rate, rW, thus leads to a higher net interest rate, i, if the incidence parameter, ~, is relatively
small.
Equation (4) is the basis for the estimation below. To account for possible measurement
error, we add a stochastic term to (4) that is assumed to consist of a region specitic component v„
a time specific component w, and a transaction specific random component e; for transaction j.
Three borrower regions are distinguished: Africa, Asia, and Latin America"'. The resulting
estimating equation is as follows,
S~ -~ j'~ ( I ; 4. )xy - N(TY.)~ t v, t w, 4 Ej
~.~
(6)
The error components v„ w, and e~ are assumed to have zero means and covariances and
variances a,Z, ow' and a,-, respectively.
3. 77~e dnru and empiric~cil resulrs
The data set consists ot' S1(1 iixlividual loans cuntracted during the pre-debt crisis pericxl of
1971-19R1. The data source is the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System that covers loans
relxirted by national authorities. All loans in the sample are to private debtors to ensure that the
loans are not exempted from withholding taxation. The loan amounts are denominated in U.S.8
dollars and interest rates are set as fixed spreads above the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).
For each loan, the month of origination, the month of maturity, the loan amount, the debtor
country, and the credi[or country are known. On a loan by loan basis, the relevant bilateral
interest withholding tax rates were collected reflecting the tax treaties between debtor and credit
nations (see the Appendix for data sources). Syndicated, multiple creditor cuuntry loans are
included in the sample only if the debtor country imposes a uniform withholding tax rate on all
outgoing interest payments.
Table I breaks down the loans by the 14 countries of residence of the private borrowers in
the data set. There is some evidence that borrowers in high withholding tax countries paid
relatively low interest spreads. Among the major borrower countries, Korea and Mexico imposed
relatively high average withholding taz rates of around 21 per cent. Borrowers in these countries
contracted relatively low average spreads of 1.20 and 0.98 per cent. Borrowers in Chile, Costa
Rica and Honduras, with lower than average withholding tax rates, instead contracted higher than
average spreads.
Next, we will discuss the results of regressions based on equation (6). As in (6), the non-
tax rate regressors are the x; risk variables multipled by 1 t i'. The results are reported in Table
2. The regression reported in the first column is for the entire sample of 510 loans contracted
during the period 1971-1981. The estimate of the S parameter is 0.123, which suggests that the
share of the incidence of nonresident withholding taxes on the creditor country treasury is about
one eighth. As expected, the investment to GNP ratio enters the regression negatively, while the
debt to GNP ratio enters positively. The ccefficient for the maturity variable is estirnated to be
negative." As discussed, U.S. banks could not obtain foreign tax credits for nonresident interest
withholding taxes in the early 1970s, unless the loan contract specified the pre-tax, gross interest
rate to be paid to the lender. To reflect the later change in IRS practice, we report a separate
regression for only the period I975-1981 in the second column of the table. The estimate of S is
now somewhat larger at 0.164. This estimate is slightly above the average of of the variable (i -
i')li, equal to 0.151 for the loans in this restricted sample. This suggests from (5) that higher
withholding taxes have led to somewhat lower net interest rates on average.
The value of potential foreign tax credits associated with withholding taxes can bey
ezpected to vary with time, as banks' ability to realize these credits also changes over time.
Second, the value of potential foreign tax credits should vary with the state of residence of the
creditor, as the generosity of tax credit provisions varies with the creditor nation. The value of the
parameter Q, therefore, is also expected to vary with time and with creditor nationality. To check
this, regressions reported in Table 3 allow for time and creditor specific estimates of ~. The
sample is restricted to the years 1975-19R1. Fur thc regression reported in colunut I, the estimates
of S only vary with the year of loan orgination. The estimates of S are positive for all years, but
they are only significant for the years (975-1978. The estimate of ~ is highest at 0.366 for the
year 1977. This year was a peak lending year, with R7 loans originations of the Sl0 in the
sample. A regression that also breaks down the ~'s by creditor nationality, in particular allowing
for separate (3's for the U.S. and the U.K., is repurted in the second colwn uf the table. The
estimates of ~ move together closely through time for the three creditor categuries. The similarity
of s estimates across creditor categories suggests that bank competition has led banks worldwide
to price loans very similarly. Again, the estimates of Q become insignificant starting in 1979.
The insignificance of the estimates of S during the years 1979-1981 is rather striking.
Apparently, banks placed little value on additional potential foreign tax credits at the end of the
1970s. A possible reason for this finding is that banks realized that they already had contracted
sufficient international loans to shelter their taxable income. Alternatively, banks had adequate
uther means of sheltering taxabte income. Finally, the second oil shock of 1979 may have reduced
bank profitability sufficiently to obviate a great need for tax shelters in the early 1980s.
To examine the potential role of bank profitability, Table 4 reports the income taxes paid
by U.S. banks as a percentage of gross before-tax income. Separate measures are reported for all
banks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and for the l0 top banks. These tax
burden measures reached lows of 24.45 and 29.86 for the two categories of U.S. banks in 1981.
This suggests that the low tax liabilities of U.S. banks around 1981 rnay have contributed to the
weaker pass through of potential tax credits into lower interest rates to LDC borruwers.
Interestingly, the lower estimates of S for the period I979-1981 just preceded the onset of
the third wurld debt crisis in August 19R2, when Mexico declared its unability to service its
fureign debt. The reduced valuation by U.S. and other banks of potential foreign taz creditslo
before 1982 could have been a contributing factor in the timing of the beginning of the debt crisis,
even if an eventual debt crisis was inevitable. The reduction of foreign tax credits by U.S. banks
was particularly unfavorable to the developing countries, as it coincided with generally higher real
interest rates in international capital markets brought on by the Volcker deflation.
There are several reasons to expect that the value of potential tax credits to banks depends
on the maturity of the international loans. First, banks are expected to value near-term credits
stemming from short term loans relatively highly, as banks that know they need such credits are
expected to be willing to pay considerably to obtain the credits. Second, short term credits should
be relatively valuable, as they cannot be reduced in value by changes in the withholding tax
regime in the borrower country or in the creditability of these withholding taxes in the creditor
country." To conclude this section, we test whether the value of po[ential foreign tax cradits
indeed depends on loan maturity. For this purpose, we split the sample for the years 1975-1981
into two pans: loans with a maturity of three years or less, and loans with a maturity of four
years or more. The results of the two regressions for the separate subsamples are reported in
Table 5. The estimates of Q are 0.595 and at 0.102 for shorter and longer term loans, respective-
ly. These results suggest that potential short term credits are indeed valued relatively highly by the
banks.
4. CortcG~siutt
This paper presents evidence that prospective tax credits available to commercial banks for
withholding taxes paid in developing countries have been reflected in international interest rates.
With the increasing volume of LDC borrowing in the 1970s, foreign tax credit provisions gained
increased attention from policy makers in both debtor and creditor countries. It is interesting,
therefore, to review how tax authorities in the two sets of countries reacted. The prospects of
higher foreign tax crc~lits provides debtor countries with clear incentives to increase withholding
tax rates. The withholding tax rates charged by the developing countries, however, have remained
fairly stable. Tax rates may not have been increased, because policy makers in the developing
countries [hough[ that higher withholding taxes would reduce net-of-tax interest rates very little, or11
they feared that the creditor country governments would in turn restrict the availability of the
foreign tax credit. Indeed, U.S. tax rules regarding soak-up disallow a foreign tax credit for
withholding taxes on interest payments whose rates are tailored to [he income tax rate of the
country of the lender. In a more suble way, Brazil has attempted to make the most of nonresident
interest withholding taxes by providing domestic borrowers with corresponding partial domestic
withholding tax rebates. This way the Brazilian authorities wished to bring about Iower net-of-tax
international interest rates, while minimizing the negative impact of nonresident withholding taxes
on domestic borcowers."
The value of creditor country tax credits has been substantial. In 1976 and 1978, U.S.
banks, for instance, received foreign tax credits of S212.6 and á277.0 million, respectively." In
response, several creditor governments have taken measures to restrict the creditability of interest
withholding taxes. The United Kingdom, speeifically, limited the creditability of Brazil's
withholding tax to 15 per cent in 1982, while Brazil's actual withholding tax rate was 25 per cent.
The IS per cent U.K. limit now applies to all debtor countries.15 In the 1986 Tax Reform Act,
the U.S. introduced an income basket approach for determining foreign tax credits. A separate
income basket was created for high withholding tax income, which is (gross) interest income taxed
at a withholding tax rate of 5 per cent or more. Available tax credits are calculated for each
income basket separately. The result of this approach is that foreign tax credits associated with
high interest withholding tax income can no longer be used to extinguish the U.S. tax liability on
other-type foreign source income. Effectively, the basket approach has limited the creditability of
interest withholding taxes.'"
This paper provides evidence that during Ihe 1979-1981 period pre-tax interest rates in the
1.1)C' lo:ut markrt JiJ nul signilicantly rcllect Iwtcntial ticrcign tax cralits. Interrsl rates generally
are nut expected to reflect potential tax credits at times when creditor banks are not profitable
enough to value additional fxriential foreign tax credits highly. A bank's ability to realize potential
foreign tax credits depends in part on non-interest foreign source income and costs. The impact of
these factors on the level of gross interest rates paid by private borrowers in developing countries
is arbitrary and probably unintended. In essence, it stems from the differences in the tax base for
the nonresident withholding tax, as applied by the borrower country, and the tax base for theiz
bank's corporate income tax, as applied by the creditor country. A closer alignment of tax base
definitions in debtor anc! creditor countries can be helpful in eliminating the present foreign tax
credit relat~Yl connection betwec:n international interest rates atxJ the overall tax positions of
creditor institutions.I3
Appendix: Description ofdata sources
The World Bank's Debtor Reporting System provides the following information on a loan
by loan basis: debtor nationality, creditor nationality, month of loan origination, month of loan
maturity, loan amount, and the interest rate spread. The loans in the sample are all to the private
sector, denominated in U.S. dollars, and they specify the spread above LIBOR. Some loans with
multiple creditor countries are included in the sample, if the debtor country imposes a uniform
interest withholding tax on all outgoing bank interest payments.
Infotmation on the country's overall debt outstanding, and also on debt service are derived
from the Debtor Reporting System.
Tax rates are compiled from the following sources:
- Corporate Taxes, a Worldwide Summary (previously called Corporate Tazes in 80
Countries), Price Waterhouse (New York), various issues.
- Irtternational 7iix Sumnraries, Coopers and Lybrand (Wiley, New York), various
ISSUeS.
And also from the following publications of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documen-
tation in Amsterdam:
- African Tax Systems, Looseleaf, E. de Brauw-Hay and F. Butzelaar-Mohr, eds..
- Taxatlon in Latin America, Looseleaf, P. Masson-Parodi, editor.
- Taxes and Investment in Latin America Looseleaf, J. van Hoorn, Jr., ed..
In some cases, tax rates have been interpolated or extrapolated, as tax rates are not
available for all countries for all years. Tax rates, and especially internationally negotiated tax
rates, however, tend to vary little from year to year.
All other data are from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary
Fund. Gross Domestic Product is used instead of Gross National Product, if the latter is not
available.14
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Table 1. Loans by Debtor Country.
Debtor Count Number ~.100 S read
Brazil 189 24.76 1.64
Chile 33 0.00 1.96
Costa Rica 48 0.00 1.84
C~te d'Ivoire 4 25.00 1.81
Cyprus I 10.00 1.75
Dominican Republic 9 18.00 1.58
Gabon 2 I8.00 I.8R
Honduras 24 5.(NI I.(~li
]amaica 3 15.33 l .50
Korea ltí8 20.55 I.20
Mexico 21 21.00 0.98
Paraguay 2 30.00 LOl
Portugal 4 IS.(Nl I.(NI
Turkey 2 0.00 1.75
Note: Data are unweighted averages. rw is the withholding tax rate and Spread is the contractual
interest spread16
























Note: The depetxlent variable is S. Parentheses indicate t-statistics.17
(Table 2, cont.)
Variables definitions are as follows:
S ,- one minus the withholdig tax rate, titnes the contractual interest
rate spread divided by the net interest rate.
rw - interest withholding tax rate (as a share)
Inf - rate of inFlation (quarterly)
Invgnp - ratio of investment to GNP (annual)
Debtgnp - ratio of external debt to GNP (annuall
Debtsexp - ratio of debt service to exports (annual)
Resgnp - ratio of reserves to GNP (annual)
Resimp - ratio of reserves to imports (annual)
Impgnp - ratio of imports to GNP (annual)
Amount - loan amount in billions of U.S. dollars
Mat - loan maturity in yearsI8
Table 3. Regression with Withholding Tax Variables for Different Years and Creditors.
All creditors USA UK Olhcr
r,,, 1975 0.240 0.324 0.215 U.217
(3.06) (3.19) (2.24) (2.46)
r~ 1976 0.130 0.199 0.135 0.113
(2.25) (2.38) (I.51) (1.82)
rw, I977 0.332 0.366 0.430 0.331
(7.20) (6.20) (3.95) (6.69)
r,,, 1978 0.170 0.232 0.150 0.166
(3.13) (3.61) (2.12) (2.76)
rW, 1979 0.066 0.029 0.124 0.045
(I.O8) (0.30) (1.57) (0.63)
rw, 1980 0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.014
(0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.19)
r,,, 1981 0.014 0.033 -0.006 0.042






















No(e: The sample period is 1975-1981. The dependent vanable is S. Parentheses m
Variables are defined in Tablc 2. US and UK creditors provided 106 and 91 loans.
t-statistics.19
Tnble 4. U.S. Banks' Income and Taxes.
Battks traded on NYSE To 10 banks
Year Gros.s Income Taxes Gross Income Taxes
- Assets Gross Iacome Assets Gro~c Income
1971 0.95 32.22 0.90 34.87
1972 0.82 30.70 0.77 33 AS
1973 0.78 31.95 0.75 35.38
1974 0.73 31.60 0.73 35.66
1975 0.78 33.96 0.78 38.21
1976 0.76 33.50 0.74 37.32
1977 0.73 32.69 0.69 35.48
1978 0.82 34.50 0.79 37.82
1979 0.83 32.48 0.80 36.61
1980 0.81 30.80 0.79 35.72
1981 0.75 24.45 0.68 29.86
Date Source: Bank Compustat. All numbers are percentages. The top 10 banks are: Citicorp,
BankAmerica, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturer's Hanover, J.P. Morgan, Chcminal, Security
Pacific, First Interstate, Bankers Ttvst and First Chicago.zo
























































Note: The samrle period is 1975-19R1. The dependent variable is S. Parentheses indicate t-
statistics. V:virbles are Jctinc~l in Table 2.zl
Ertd~rores
1. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (forthcoming) instead examine how withholding taxes on
equity returns accruing ta nonresidents affect pre-tax returns on emerging stock markets in
developing countries during the 1987-1992 period.
2. Brazil, Colombia and lndonesia, however, are exceptions to this rule among the develo-
ping countries (KPMG, 1988).
3. An apparent was that German banks could hold Deutschmark bonds fur their customers
without reporting such holdings to the tax authorities.
4. The switch in IRS policy regarding the creditability of nonresident interest withholding
taxes associated with net interest rate loans was not initiated by the IRS and did not result
from litigation. Instead, the banking sector and, in particular, Citicorp challenged existing
IRS practice indirectly by claiming foreign tax credits on their tax returns for net interest
rate as well as gross interest rate Ioans. On a technical basis, the IRS decided to honor the
claimed foreign tax credits on net interest ra[e loans. This tacit switch in IRS practice
became common knowledge in the U.S. banking sector sometime in the second half of the
1970s.
5. This is the case for a U.S. bank, if it dces business in the source country through a
branch. Othetwise, the withholding tax is treated as a non-creditable excise tax.
6. As an example, let rw be 0.20, let i be 0.10, and let i' be 0.08. The gross interest rate, is,
is 0.125 (from O.IOI(LO - 0.2)). Per dollar lent, the tax withheld by the borrowing
country is 0.025 (from (0.10'0.201(1 - 0.20)). Income by creditor country definition is
0.045 per dollar lent. This means that the effective borrowing country tax - by creditor
country definition - is 56 (from 0.025I0.045) per cent rather than 20 per cent. This
implies that the bank may well be in excess credit position, as 56 per cent exceeds, for
instance, the top U.S. corporate tax rate.
7. The discussion assumes that (i) banks can obtain foreign taz credits for withholding taxes
paid to the point where creditor country taxes on foreign source income are zero, and that
(ii) banks earn no excess profits. Neither assumption fully reflects reality. In practice the
international banking market consists of banks from many countries that differ in the
domestic [ax relief that is provided for foreign withholding taxes. Treatments range from
no relief at all, a mere deduction, and a credit with limits as for U.S. banks, to a credit
without any geographical limits (see Foreign Tax Credits for Banks, KPMG, pp. 20-z3 for
a summary for all majur credit countries). Cuuntries I'urther freyucntly apply Jifferem
rules for different debtor countries depending on bilateral tax treatic~s. The securxl
assumption of no excess profits clearly is only an approximation as well. A full treatment
of the supply side of the international loan market, taking into account the number of
creditor counlries, the numher of banks in each creditor country, all countries' tax
trr:ununts uf fareign source income, etc., is heyond the scope of this paper.
8. Luan default and the ex fxist availability of forcign tax credits are assumed to be indepen-
dent events.22
9. Alternatively, we can assume that [he interest rate faced by borrowers is the net interest
rate if governments offer their private borrowers withholding tax rebates. Replacing ir by i
in (3) and using (2) we can now derive
i-i' r
- ~ry'(I } t )x` - R I -Wr t .~ .,
(4')
Now it is seen that dildr„ ~ 0. Regressions analogous to those in Table 2 based on (4')
show an insignificant R parameter, which suggests (3) is in fact the correct specification.
I0. Feder and lust J1977J and Edwards J 1984j assume Fxirrower nation specific error compo-
nents rather than region specific compcments. Such an error structure in the present
context precludes an independent effect for withholding taxes on the variable S, as tax
rates vary little for loans contracted by the same borrower.
I I. The lauer effect may in par[ retlect the tenn structure of interesl rates.
12. Note that changes in U.S. tax regulations regarding the creditability of tiireign withholding
taxes are likely to be accompanied by 'grandfather rules' exempting outstanding loans
from the regulatory changes.
13. These withholding taxes are essentially fraudulent and they do not qualify for a foreign tax
credit under U.S. law.
14. See Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income - 1976-1979, International Income and
Taxes, Foreign Income and Taxes Reported on U.S. Income Tax Reforms, Table 2, p. 97
and Internat Revenue Service Statistics of Income, Compendium of Studies of International
Income and Taxes, Table I, p.36.
l5. See Foreign Tax Credits for Banks, KPMG, p. 171.
16. Somewhat ironically, the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which reduced tax incentives for foreign
lending, just followed the Baker plan for dealing with third world debt launched in 1985,
which called for continued voluntary commercial bank lending [o the highly indebted
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